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Abstract
I apply a standard model of sovereign debt in order to identify the optimal costs of
default from the ex-ante point of view of the borrower. I depart from the literature by
distinguishing events of strong economic crises from standard business cycles. Crisis
events seem to be appropriate moments in which the option to default might be wel-
fare improving by providing state contingency in the debt contract. The quantitative
analysis shows that the costs of default should be limited, leaving default as an option,
but at much higher levels than the ones consistent with the observed debt-output and
default ratios of emerging economies. The results in this paper have implication on
the evolution of sovereign debt workout procedures and the potential demand for new
debt instruments.
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31 Introduction
A particular feature of sovereign debt is the fact that no international court has eective
power to enforce repayment. It is a common view in the literature that its sustainability
depends on the belief that a country that defaults will incur losses directly or indirectly
imposed by their creditors.1 The fact that default is costly is the mechanism that makes
unsecured sovereign debt possible.
I apply a standard incomplete markets model of sovereign debt along the lines of Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008)2 in order to identify the optimal costs of default
from the ex-ante point of view of the borrower. I depart from those papers by distinguishing
events of strong economic crises from standard business cycles in the output process. Those
events seem to be appropriate moments in which the option to default might be welfare
improving by providing some state contingency in the debt contract.3
Since the borrowing country cannot commit to repay its debt, it always chooses to default
whenever it is protable to do so. The lender, which is assumed to be risk neutral, adjusts
the interest rate of the debt contract according to the probability of repayment, such that
the expected return on lending to the sovereign country equals the risk-free rate. Under
these standard assumptions, the lender is indierent to the frequency of default or the level
of default costs whereas the borrower faces a trade-o.
Among the reasons for a sovereign country to issue debt, impatience and self-insurance
motives ask for a harsh punishment for default, such that it becomes a less attractive option.
As a result, higher levels of debt would be sustainable and the interest rate would be closer
1See Dooley (2000) and Cohen and Sachs (1986).
2Those models are based on the framework proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
3State contingency in the debt contract is discussed in Grossman and Van Huyck (1988). They dieren-
tiate excusable default, which does not trigger default costs, from debt repudiation, which never happens in
equilibrium.
4to the risk-free rate. Weaker costs of default would favor another reason to issue debt,
insurance. If there is a state of the world in which paying back the debt becomes a huge
burden, without having default as an option, the borrower would anticipate it and would
not hold much debt. Lower costs of default would increase the country's demand for debt
considering the option to avoid repayment during economic crises. Reasonable default costs
should allow enough debt to provide transfers of wealth from the future to the present and,
at the same time, leave default as an option, which would act as an insurance component in
the case of bad shocks.
I briey discuss the literature about the interaction of default and insurance in section
2, and also provide a simple two-period example that illustrates the exercise performed in
this paper. The example conrms that the default costs are necessary for unsecured debt to
be sustainable, but if those costs are excessive, they reduce borrowers' demand for debt due
to precautionary motives. As a result, welfare is maximized at intermediate levels of default
costs.
This paper is motivated by a set of evidence suggesting a recent trend to reducing de-
fault costs for debtor countries.4 In terms of access to external nance, Gelos et al. (2004)
nd that, on average, defaulters regained access to international nancial markets in more
than four years in the 1980's, whereas in the 1990's, this average reduced to less than four
months.5 Conrming this movement, Dooley (2000) refers to an IMF press release from
1999, in which the director of the fund recommended the approval of Ecuador's request for
nancial assistance before an agreement with its creditors had been reached.6 This rec-
4According to Tomz and Wright (2007), there has been much debate in recent years about policies to
reduce the frequency and costs of sovereign default.
5This reduction can be partially explained by a change in the composition of debt instruments, from
syndicated bank lending to bonds.
6The justication was that Ecuador was \making good faith eorts to reach a collaborative agreement
with its creditors".
5ommendation revealed some leniency, since the fund used to require the agreement before
providing nancial assistance.
Also, many proposals to rule sovereign debt restructurings focus on reducing the losses
associated with this process. One example is the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mecha-
nism (SDRM), proposed in Krueger (2001).7 Considering contractual approaches, the recent
introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) on sovereign bonds, a contractual feature
that facilitates debt renegotiation, is another movement towards lower default costs.8 After
Bulow and Rogo (1989), which showed that reputational-based debt is not sustainable un-
der a broad range of assumptions, the current consensus is that reputation cannot be the
only cost of default. Lowering its additional costs could increase the likelihood of default for
a given debt level, which would increase the costs of borrowing and lower capital ows.
The results in this paper indicate that decreasing default costs would leave borrowers
worse o in ex-ante terms. The quantitative analysis shows that the costs of default should
be limited, leaving default as an option for states of high debt and bad shocks, but the optimal
level is much higher than the one consistent with the observed debt levels and default rates
of emerging economies. Those results are presented in section 7. The pictures therein clearly
illustrate that the optimal level of default costs are far beyond the ones corresponding to the
original calibration of the parameters. Those optimal costs would sustain an average debt
level of ve times the country's output, whereas the target for the calibration is an average
debt level of 44.1% of output. With such higher costs, emerging economies would be able to
borrow much more and, more interestingly, default more frequently.9
In the empirical section, I use the classication of rare disasters of Barro (2006) to dene
7The evolution of ideas that anteceded the SDRM is discussed in Rogo and Zettelmeyer (2002).
8Those clauses allow for a previously dened majority of bondholders to agree on a change in payment
terms that is binding on all bondholders. An analysis of this feature is developed in Haldane et al. (2005).
9Default is more frequent because the option of discharging such higher levels of debt compensates for its
higher costs.
6the events of strong economic crisis. Those events, reported in section 3, were characterized
by a huge drop in real per capita output in a short period of time. Most of those events were
related to the World Wars or to the Great Depression, which aected most of the countries.
Other events, specic to some countries or regions, were mostly experienced by developing
economies. This empirical fact should reinforce the role of default as insurance because it
makes the income process closer to a binary process. Since the model also considers default
a binary choice, it would respond better to this kind of shock than to the gradual output
shocks representing business cycles.
A detailed description of the model is provided in section 4. In the model, the default
decision generates two consequences for the debtor country. First, the country cannot borrow
from international nancial markets, which is the reputation cost. Also, there are output
losses, often assumed to be due to problems in domestic nancial markets during the process
of debt renegotiation or even as an eect of being cut o from trade nance. Those costs
last for a stochastic number of periods and act as a punishment for default. The parameters
related to the output cost and the probability of redemption, meaning the moment when the
consequences of default are eliminated, are calibrated and then compared to their optimal
values.
The calibration procedure is described in section 5. The benchmark calibration of the
model is intended to replicate a typical emerging economy. In order to generate a coun-
tercyclical trade balance and more volatile consumption, this calibration requires a highly
persistent output shock.10 A lower autocorrelation parameter is considered in the low per-
sistence calibration as a robustness check. In both calibrations, the default costs are much
lower than optimal values, which provide welfare levels close to the elimination of default. In
10Those are stylized facts of emerging economies. See Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006).
7order to reinforce this result, the severe crisis calibration is also considered. Under the as-
sumption that emerging economies may face economic crises stronger than the ones already
observed, but similar to the ones faced by OECD economies, which include eects of the
World Wars; the optimal costs of default are lower, but never close to the calibrated values.
Statistics generated from simulations of the model are provided in section 6. I also
compare the behavior of the model with the data around crisis events. The simulated
time series generated by the model must be similar to the ones corresponding to emerging
economies facing economic crises in order to show that the model is a good representation of
reality and therefore generates reliable results in terms of optimal costs of default. The model
replicates the strong reaction of the trade balance to an economic crisis, a stylized fact of
emerging economies, but the correct timing of default choices is aected by the assumption
that default is never partial.
2 Discussion on default and insurance
In the theoretical literature, default plays two distinct roles. When market incompleteness
is an endogenous eect of the limited commitment represented by the option to default, it
reduces risk sharing. Agents limit their wealth transfers, keeping them within a level that
would not leave their counterparts willing to break the risk sharing scheme. However, if the
set of available assets is exogenously assumed incomplete, default may improve risk sharing
by allowing borrowers to enter contracts that they may not be able or willing to repay in
some states.
The rst case, in which risk sharing is reduced, is considered in Kehoe and Levine (1993)
and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). They study economies with a complete set of contingent
claims in which default is punished with permanent exclusion from nancial markets. The full
8set of contingent claims allows the denition of the debt contract as a portfolio of such assets
such that the repayment values given each future state will never leave the borrower willing
to default. The presence of potential default, even though it never happens in equilibrium,
generates endogenous borrowing limits.11
In the second case, in economies with exogenously incomplete markets, default actually
happens in equilibrium. Zame (1993) and Dubey et al. (1988, 2005) show that, in this case,
default may generate the opposite eect, improving risk sharing. Zame (1993) argues that
default allows agents to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high
probability, but not with certainty. This situation is observed when some contract allows
the agent to transfer income between two states, but leaves a high negative payo for some
improbable third state. If default were not allowed, the agent would anticipate the possibility
of the third state and reduce his position in the contract which, in turn, would reduce his
otherwise optimal transfer of wealth. The option to default allows the optimal transfer of
wealth given that, in the case of the realization of the low probability state, the agent will
optimally choose to default accepting a reasonable punishment. This argument is made clear
by the example that follows.
Example with non-contingent bond
I present a simple example in order to illustrate the trade-o generated by the costs related
to the default decision. Assume that the economy lasts for two periods in order to abstract
from reputation eects. There is a xed endowment for the rst period y1 = 1; and two
possible endowments for the second period, y2 = 2 with probability 98% or y2 = 0:1 with
11Default may also reduce risk sharing in an economy with a single uncontingent bond, but not in a natural
way. In Zhang (1997), for example, a borrowing limit is dened at the point in which the uncontingent
repayment value is such that the agent is indierent between defaulting or not in at least one state, whereas
he strictly prefers not defaulting in all remaining states.
9probability 2%. Therefore, the economy is expected to grow, since the expected value of the
endowment in the second period is almost twice its value in the rst period, but the low
probable bad shock generates a strong precautionary savings eect.
Consumption in the rst period is given by c1 = y1 + q(b)b, where q(b) is the price of
the country's debt, or the inverse of the gross interest rate, and this value is a function of
the amount of debt taken. In the second period, the agent has the option to default on his
debt. If he does not choose to do so, his consumption is equal to c2 = y2   b. If he defaults,
he avoids debt repayment, however there is an output cost , so consumption in this case is
given by c2 = (1   )y2.
The expected utility can be written as:
EV (b) = u(c1) +  [pu(c2;1) + (1   p)u(c2;2)]
where p = 0:98.
Given a risk-free interest rate, the price of debt is the present value of the expected value
of repayment, which is equal to one minus the probability of defaulting, which depends on




This pricing kernel assumes risk neutral lenders, so that only the expected value of
repayment matters.
The intertemporal discount factor , the risk-free rate and the utility function are pa-
rameterized as:





The parameter , which represents the output loss if default is chosen in the second
period, denes an endogenous borrowing limit, a value b such that (1   )y2  y2   b for
all states in the second period with strict equality for one of them. This value is given by
b = 2 > 0:1, so that the agent defaults on the bad state and it is assumed that he does
not default in the good state, in which he is indierent.
In gure 1, the debt level and the corresponding expected utility are illustrated for three
scenarios: when the agent can commit to repay his debt in any case, so there is no default;
when the agent commits to repay only if hit by the good shock in the second period, then
default only happens in the low state; and when the agent cannot commit and decides ex-post
whether or not to default. The last scenario corresponds to the actual objective function of
the agent.
The upper-left graphic,  = 0, illustrates the case in which there is no output cost
of default, therefore the borrowing limit is zero since the borrower would always choose
to default. Since no borrowing is sustainable, the agent chooses to save for precautionary
motives. He would be better o if he could commit to default only in the bad shock.
Since ex-post the agent would default in both states, his inability to commit prevents this
allocation.
In the upper-right graphic,  = 0:10, the agent is able to borrow up to a borrowing
limit b = 0:20. The agent would like to borrow more if he could but the borrowing limit
is binding, resulting in the corner solution b = b. An interior solution is obtained in the
lower-left graphic, with  = 0:30, the higher borrowing limit b = 0:60 is not binding. At this
11point, an increase in the output cost of default, although improving the agent's ability to
borrow, does not generate any benet since the agent does not take advantage of it. Actually,
the only eect of a higher cost is hurting more the agent when he chooses to default, which
is still the optimal choice when the bad endowment shock is realized.
Finally, the insurance role of default is eliminated when  is set to 0:45, which is observed
in the lower-right graphic. In this case, the interior solution obtained with  = 0:30 turns
out to be a local maximum. The cost of default is so high that, rather than issuing debt
in the rst period, the agent's optimal choice turns back to be the same level of savings
b < 0, observed when he was unable to borrow ( = 0). The precautionary savings motive
dominates: the agent anticipates the possibility of the realization of the bad endowment
shock, in which either paying back the debt or defaulting generates a very low utility level,
and decides not to borrow.
Summarizing all cases, the expected utility and the optimal choice of debt of the agent
unable to commit are represented in gure 2, both as a function of the output cost. For
lower values of , a small increase allows for higher levels of debt but leaves default as
an option in the case of the bad shock, increasing the expected utility. For higher values
of  (above 0:2), a further increase lowers expected utility. When  lies in the interval
between 0:2 and 0:25, although the debt level increases from roughly 0:4 to 0:5, the utility
loss due to the expected default costs dominates the gains from front-loading consumption,
decreasing expected utility. When  is greater than 0:25, there is no benet from relaxing
the endogenous borrowing constraint by further increases of this parameter, the only eect
is a higher expected default cost. The agent does not borrow when  is greater than 0:4,
therefore there is no role for default and further increases of  turn out to be inocuous.
This simple example illustrates the objective of this paper. In a model calibrated in
order to match observed business cycles statistics and stylized facts of emerging economies,















































































































Figure 1: Optimal debt level given dierent output costs of default . When  = 0, no borrowing is
sustainable. Increasing it relaxes the borrowing limit. Borrowing limit is binding when  = 10% and is not
binding when  = 30%. When  = 45% the cost of default is so high that it is not optimal to default in any
case, the optimal level of debt is the same as when  = 0.
in which events of economic crisis are explicitly considered, I perform a similar exercise.
Comparing the optimal costs of default with the ones obtained in the calibrations, I intend
to identify which eect is dominating: if the costs are high, weakening the insurance role of
default, or low, generating borrowing limits that decrease welfare in sovereign countries by
limiting their capacity to front-load consumption.
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Optimal debt given output cost f
Figure 2: Left: Expected utility given output cost of default . Right: Amount of debt optimally chosen
by the agent given . For lower values, an increase in  relaxes the borrowing limit and improves welfare.
At some point, the loss of output generated by the cost of default reduces welfare. When a threshold value
is reached, default is never chosen and the agent does not borrow.
3 Events of economic crises
In general, the business cycle literature relies on well-behaved processes to model output
movements. Those processes may be successful in replicating moments of output time se-
ries, however, they ignore rare but strong shocks that sometimes hit economies and could
potentially aect agent's decisions. Robert Barro tries to identify such events, which he calls
rare disasters. In Barro (2006), he measures the frequency and size of international eco-
nomic disasters during the twentieth century. Those events are part of the history of many
economies, independently of their level of development or geographic location. The set of
events considered are related to the World War I, the Great Depression and the World War
II among others specic to countries or regions. In gure 3 there are plots of the times series
of log real per capita GDP of four countries, two European developed economies: Austria
and Spain; and two Latin American emerging economies: Argentina and Chile. The events
of economic crisis are identied by the shaded areas.
















































Figure 3: Real per capita GDP normalized to 100 in 2006 (in logs) for Austria, Spain, Argentina and Chile
from 1900 to 2006. The shaded areas represent the economic crisis described in Barro (2006), corresponding
to periods of declines of 15% or more in this variable.
The eects of the Great Depression can be observed for Austria, Argentina and Chile.
Austria's output was also strongly aected by both World Wars. Spain, which was doing
relatively well during those periods, had an event of its own: the Spanish Civil War generated
a huge per capita output contraction in the 30's. According to the criterion used in the paper,
the developed world seems to be free of crises after the World War II. This is not, however,
the case for emerging economies. Economic crises have been present in each emerging country
or region in its own time, as illustrated for Chile in the 70's and 80's and for Argentina more
recently.
15The distribution of the size of contractions is illustrated in gure 4 and reveals that those
shocks can be extremely strong, usually as a result of wars.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the size of contractions in economic disasters described in Barro (2006). Some
declines of more than 50% could be observed.
In the model described in the next section, the rare events of economic crisis are repre-
sented by permanent shocks to output. The economy is assumed to follow a constant growth
path in normal times and, with a xed probability, switches to a crisis state in which the
growth rate is negative. The government, aware of the possibility of such events, has to
choose its debt stock balancing its desire to front-load consumption from expected output
growth and its precautionary savings motive.
4 Model
The sovereign country is represented by a small open economy, whose benevolent government
seeks to maximize the expected discounted lifetime utility of a risk-averse representative






where  2 (0;1) is the intertemporal discount factor. Each period's utility is represented by




In each period, the output is given by a stochastic endowment. Following Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006, 2007), the endowment process is dened as a function of two shocks and is
represented by the following expression:
yt =  te
zt
where  t is a trend and ezt is a transitory component. The trend component accumulates







The growth shock gt and the temporary shock zt are assumed to be independent of each
other and both follow their own Markov processes. The log of the transitory component of
output, zt, follows an AR(1) process given by:
zt = (1   )z + zt 1 + "t; "t  N(0;
2
")
where z is the unconditional mean,  is the autocorrelation parameter and "t is an i.i.d.
shock of variance 2
".
17The realization of the growth shock denes whether the economy is in normal times or
in a crisis state. In normal times the economy grows at the xed log growth rate g. During
crisis, the economy grows at a negative log growth rate e g. Those states switch between
each other following a transition matrix which is a function of the parameters  and e ,
corresponding to the probability of switching from normal to crisis times and, once in the
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Due to the presence of growth, output is not stationary. In order to have a stationary
problem that can be solved with the usual recursive dynamic optimization techniques, a
transformation has to be applied to the variables: they are normalized by the accumulated
trend growth up to period t 1 times the growth rate in normal times eg. For each original




Given the homothetic structure of the utility function, utility as a function of detrended







In the following sections, I deal only with normalized variables and never their full coun-
terparts so, for ease of notation, I do not use the hat to identify them. The value functions
are also normalized by the term (eg t 1)
1 . Details of the value function transformation
are provided in the appendix.
184.1 Sovereign government's problem
There are three state variables in the government's problem: the stock of debt b, for which
positive values represent debt and negative values represent savings; the temporary shock
z and the growth shock g. Given the current stock of debt and both shocks to output, the









where V c(b;z;g) represents the expected discounted utility of staying in the debt contract
for one more period, and V d(0;z;g) corresponds to the default decision. The stock of debt
turns out to be zero in the case of default because it is assumed that the agent defaults on his
whole stock of debt and never renegotiates. Also, defaulting is a strictly dominated strategy
for an agent with a positive net stock of assets (negative b) and the fact that V d(0;z;g) is
the continuation utility directly implies that the agent entered the period with some debt.
Considering the case in which default is not chosen, the sovereign government has to














s:t: c = e
(g g)e




The term e(g g) is equal to one in normal times, which makes detrended output equal to
ez, which gives the value function a usual balanced growth path structure. In times of crisis
19e(g g) is lower than one in order to account for the negative growth shock.12
If the government chooses to default, the positive debt stock is set to zero and the country
temporarily loses its ability to borrow from international nancial markets. In addition to
not being able to borrow, the country faces an output cost of default y. The country regains
total access to international nancial markets with probability . The government's problem



















s:t: c = (1   )e
(g g)e
z   b +
egb0
1 + r
The country is still allowed to save during the autarky period, therefore b0 is still a choice
variable, but constrained to be lower or equal to zero. In the budget constraint, the price of
the bond is explicitly represented as the inverse of the gross risk-free interest rate, since it is
assumed that the country saves in riskless assets.
4.2 Pricing sovereign bonds
The international nancial markets consist of risk-neutral lenders that discount the future at
a xed risk-free interest rate r. Since the country's government cannot commit to the debt
repayment, it has the choice of defaulting and suering the associated costs, the market price
of the bonds issued is calculated taking into account the probability of such event happening.
Once it is assumed that lenders are risk neutral, the current price of a future payment is
based exclusively on the expected value of such payment. In order to account for the future






= eg, we have b yt =
eg
egezt = e(g g)ezt.
20states in which the debt is repaid, it is useful to dene the repayment set C(b;g):
C(b;g) =






This set contains the values of z for which, given the amount of debt b and the growth
shock g, the utility of staying in the contract is greater or equal to the utility of defaulting.





































The price is dened for normal times and crisis times, the only dierence being the
probabilities associated with those states in the subsequent period,  and e . The price of
debt of face value one is given by the probability that this face value is paid by the debtor
in the future discounted by the risk-free rate r.
When the value of b is negative, which means that the country is saving, the repayment
set comprehends all possible values of the shock z, dened by the set Z, which means that,
for b0  0, q(b0;z;g) =
1
1 + r
for any values of z and g.
4.3 Denition of equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium for the transformed model, with deated variables, is stated as
follows.
Denition 1. A recursive equilibrium is dened as a set of policy functions for: (i) con-
21sumption c(b;z;g); (ii) next period's debt stock b(b;z;g); a no default set C(b;g) and a price
function q(b0;z;g) such that:
1. Taking the price function as given, the policy functions satisfy the government's opti-
mization problem represented by (2), (3) and (4); and the corresponding value functions
dene the repayment sets according to (5);
2. The price function reects the default probabilities given the repayment set and the
output process, such that lenders break even in expected value, which is represented by
equations (6) and (7).
5 Calibration
For evaluating the eect of dierent costs of default, the model is calibrated in order to
replicate some statistics and stylized facts of a real economy. The focus is on emerging
economies, since those are the ones usually involved in episodes of debt crises and default.
The coecient of relative risk aversion in the utility function is set to 2, a standard value
widely used in the macro literature. The risk-free interest rate is calibrated to 4%, based
on the U.S. annual interest rate. The remaining parameters are set in order to match some
empirical observations of emerging economies data.
The time series of real per capita GDP are taken from Barro and Urs ua (2008).13 In
order to compare their statistics, the countries are included in ve non-exclusive groups:
all countries, emerging economies, Latin America, Asia and OECD. The countries and the
groups they are included in are listed in the appendix.
13The dataset in Barro and Urs ua (2008) covers 40 countries, but only the 35 countries considered in Barro
(2006) are used here.
22The time series are split between normal times and crisis times. For the statistics of
normal times, observations corresponding to the crisis periods listed in Barro (2006) are
dropped from the sample. Periods of ve years after the end of each crisis are also discharged
in order to avoid a possible dierent behavior during recovery periods. For the remaining
data, only continuous periods of at least 10 years are considered and then have their trend
removed with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter.14 Business cycle statistics during crises are
not calculated since the crisis periods are very short for a trend to be identied. Those
statistics are listed on table 1.
Table 1: Statistics for each country group
# of countries y  " g e g
Emerging economies 12 3:71% 0:4056 3:37% 2:59%  6:86%
Latin America 8 3:64% 0:4611 3:22% 2:37%  6:90%
Asia 7 3:70% 0:4060 3:37% 2:90%  8:99%
OECD 23 3:78% 0:4202 3:43% 2:45%  9:46%
all countries 35 3:67% 0:4121 3:33% 2:46%  8:75%
Business cycles statistics, respectively, standard deviation of the cycle and, for the AR(1) process,
autocorrelation and standard deviation of the error term. Also, average growth rates for normal
and crisis times.
The statistics for normal times, represented by the rst four columns of values, are very
similar across groups. Dierences are evident for the growth rate during crisis times, e g,
with values ranging from  6:86% to  9:46%. Dierences in those values should be expected
since there are only few observations of those events. Most of the economies that belong to
the OECD were the ones more involved in the World Wars, which is the reason for their
very low e g. This value is also considered for the calibration of emerging economies as a
robustness exercise, since those economies have been increasing their nancial integration
with the world and, in addition to the benets it may bring, it also leaves them more exposed
14The HP-lter smoothing parameter  is set to 100.
23to international crises which could cause similar economic disasters.
Emerging economies' detrended output has a standard deviation of 3:71% in normal
times. It is assumed that it follows an AR(1) process, which is estimated, yielding an
autocorrelation coecient of 0:41 and a standard deviation of the error term equal to 3:37%.
The AR(1) process for the model's output is approximated using the algorithm in Tauchen
(1986). The parameters used in the model should generate simulated time series with the
same statistics obtained in the data after the trend is extracted by the same procedure, the
HP-lter.
When the model is simulated with an autocorrelation parameter  = 0:86 and an error
term standard deviation of " = 4:1%, it is able to yield the same statistics obtained in the
data. However, the parameter  is not precisely determined, since setting it to 0:96, and
keeping the same standard deviation of the error term, changes the estimated autocorrelation
to 0:43. This value is within one standard deviation (0:03) of the original estimated value.
The problem with setting  = 0:86 is that the model generates a positive correlation of output
and trade balance and an excessive consumption smoothing: the volatility of consumption
being lower than the one for output. Both of these features are counterfactual for emerging
economies.15 Setting  = 0:96, however, generates statistics qualitatively right: a correlation
of output and trade balance of  18:3% and a ratio of standard deviations of consumption
and output of 1:12. Thus, the value of 0:96 is adopted in the benchmark calibration whereas
the other one is used for robustness check.
A higher persistence of the output shock increases its eect on the level of debt in which
the government is indierent between defaulting or not. This level of debt denes the limit
of the default region, illustrated in gure 5. It is almost close to a vertical line with  = 0:86
and it is less steep with  = 0:96: The debt price q(b0;z;g) will also be more sensitive to the
15An extensive analysis of business cycles of emerging economies is found in Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
24current shock z: with persistence, a higher z0 in the following period is expected given a high
z today, lowering the probability of default. This feature allows for more borrowing in good
times due to a lower interest rate (higher q()), which allows for more consumption than
what would be given exclusively by a higher current output. It generates more volatility of
consumption with respect to output and a countercyclical trade balance.
























Benchmark calibration (r = 0.96)
z
Figure 5: Default region for dierent calibrations of the model. Output shock has almost no eect on the
default decision when  = 0:86. The eect of the shock increases with persistence, which is observed when
 = 0:96.
The log growth rates are set to the average rst-dierence of the log real per-capita output
of all countries considered in the sample. The average is calculated separately for normal
times and crisis times and the corresponding values are used to calibrate the parameters g
and e g, respectively. The average log growth rate of emerging economies during normal times
is equal to 2:59%, whereas the corresponding value for crisis periods is of  6:86%.
The parameter  determines the probability of switching from normal times to a crisis
event. In order to calibrate it, I consider the number of crisis observed in the sample,
independent of their duration, since the event of entering the crisis is what is relevant. This
number is divided by the number of years in normal times for all countries considered. The
duration of each crisis is used to calibrate e , the probability of remaining in crisis. The
25average duration of observed crisis should be equal to
1
1   e 
. For emerging economies,
crisis events start with probability 1.97% and last for 5 years on average. Those values are
presented in table 2.
Table 2: Frequency and duration of crisis
Probability Probability of
of crisis remaining in crisis
Emerging economies 1:97% 80:16% (5.04 years on average)
Latin America 2:58% 78:43% (4.63 years on average)
Asia 1:22% 80:00% (5.00 years on average)
OECD 1:44% 79:77% (4.94 years on average)
all countries 1:74% 79:23% (4.81 years on average)
The parameter , which determines the probability of redemption after a default decision,
is set to 21:28%, which results in an average period of 4.7 years in which the country is unable
to borrow. This autarky spell was found by Gelos et al. (2004) to be the mean time for a
defaulting country to regain access to international nancial markets in the 80's.
The output cost of default  and the intertemporal discount factor  are set in order to
match the probability of default conditional on a crisis and the average debt level of emerging
economies. A lower  increases the average debt level, due to impatience, but it also increases
the incidence of default on crisis. While  is chosen to match the latter, the output cost 
is used to adjust the debt level. A higher value of  would make the representative agent
more patient, remaining only the insurance motive to justify holding debt with the option
to default. In this case however, instead of holding debt, the country self-insures by saving.
The crisis events related in Barro (2006) are listed in the appendix. The last column of
the table signalizes when a default decision coincided with those crisis.16 Considering the
emerging economies only, there are 25 crisis events, 10 of them coinciding with a default
16The default events are listed in the appendix. The list considers three sources and was extracted from
Borensztein and Panizza (2008).
26decision: 40% of the cases. This number decreases to 28% if all countries are considered and
increases to 50% when restricted to Latin America. This incidence of default is consistent
with the nding of Tomz and Wright (2007) that only one-third of debtors lapsed into
default during extremely hard times. The parameters are chosen to match the value of 40%,
corresponding to emerging economies.
The model, calibrated to match the incidence of default on crisis, generates an overall
probability of default around 0:75%, which is low compared to the data. The low incidence
of default events is a known problem of sovereign debt models.17 One explanation is that
many default events happen during political turnovers and are due to opportunistic reasons
or myopic governments.18 The model abstracts from those motives, therefore generating a
probability of default which is low compared to historical observation.
The target for the average debt level is based on the observations documented by Reinhart
et al. (2003). They document the fact that emerging market economies cannot sustain debt-
GDP ratios higher than 50%, citing as examples the debt crisis of Mexico, in 1982, and
Argentina, in 2001, which occurred at ratios of 47% and 50% respectively. The value of
44:1% used in the calibration is the average of the period from 1970 to 2000 for emerging
economies which have defaulted in the past. All benchmark calibration parameters are
reported on table 3.
Two alternative calibrations are also considered. The low persistence calibration keeps
the autocorrelation  equal to 0:86, value that matches the autocorrelation estimated from
the data but, as explained before, generates counterfactual features: a procyclical trade
17Arellano (2008) considers asymmetric default output costs, in which the cost is lower in recessions, in
order to match a probability of default of 3% for Argentina. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show that an
output process driven by growth shocks to increase the probability of default.
18Kohlscheen (2010) mentions that some default episodes, such as in Peru in 1989 and Argentina in 2001,
have actually coincided with inauguration speeches of presidents. Hatchondo et al. (2008) and Cuadra and
Sapriza (2008) consider political turnover in their models.
27Table 3: Model parameters - benchmark calibration
Risk aversion  = 2 standard
Interest rate r = 4% U.S. annual interest rate
Output process  = 0:96 c=y > 1 and corr(y;tb=y) < 0
" = 4:1% st. dev. of detrended output y = 3:71%
Normal times growth g = 2:59% average log growth rate in normal times
Crisis growth e g =  6:86% average log growth rate during crisis
Probability of redemption  = 21:28% average autarky period of 4.7 years
Output cost of default  = 11:4% incidence of default on crisis of 40%
Discount factor  = 0:95 average debt level of 44:1%
Prob. of entering a crisis  = 1:97% from emerging economies data
Prob. of remaining in crisis e  = 80:16% from emerging economies data
balance and excess consumption smoothing. After setting  = 0:86, the other parameters
are set in order to match the same targets as in the benchmark calibration. The remaining
calibration considers the lowest value for the growth rate during crisis, e g =  9:46%, which
corresponds to OECD countries. In this calibration it is assumed that stronger crisis are
expected, but they were not realized for emerging economies during the time period covered
by the sample. Another view could be that the development of those economies and their
integration with the world, in addition to bringing benets, also leaves them exposed to
shocks to which they were not in the past. In this calibration, only the parameter e g is
changed. Instead of attempting to match the targets as in the previous calibrations, the idea
is to observe the eect of this change on the results.
Table 4: Alternative calibrations




e g  0:0686  0:0946
Remaining parameters keep their original values.
286 Simulation
The model is simulated and, for each calibration, 5000 samples of 1000 years are generated.
Only the last 100 years of each sample are considered, in order to avoid the eect of initial
conditions. The simulation statistics are listed on table 5.
Table 5: Simulation results
benchmark low persistence severe crisis
y 3:7% 3:7% 3:7%
c=y 1:13 0:92 1:12
corr(y;tb=y)  0:219 0:347  0:179
average b 0:440 0:442 0:458
default on crisis 40:01% 40:55% 70:94%
share of default on crisis 98:73% 100% 97:99%
total default incidence 0:75% 0:75% 1:35%
Standard deviation of output and consumption taken after trend is removed by the
HP-lter. Average debt measured as fraction of GDP.
Both the benchmark and the low persistence calibrations were dened in order to match
target values of the average debt level and the probability of default conditional on a crisis
event. As mentioned before, the low persistence calibration generates counterfactual pro-
cyclical trade balance and excess consumption smoothing (c=y < 1). The severe crisis
diers from the benchmark calibration in just one parameter, which is the growth rate dur-
ing crisis events, it is equal to  6:86% in the benchmark and changes to  9:46% in the severe
crisis calibration. It is not aimed at matching any other statistic. Using this calibration, the
consumption volatility and the correlation of output and trade balance is roughly the same
and there is a small increase in the average debt level. The incidence of default on crisis
events increases to 70%.
Besides observing the model's statistics, it is important to understand its behavior around
crises, since they are the main trigger of default, and verify if it is similar to what is observed
29in the data. To this end, I present a simulated time series of output, consumption, debt-
output ratio and trade-balance-output ratio in gure 6; and some time series comprehending
periods of crises listed in Barro (2006) in gure 7. The latter includes examples of output
contractions in Chile and Philippines, at the beginning of the 80's; and Argentina and
Indonesia, at the end of the 90's. In all cases, the shaded areas correspond to crisis events
and the periods of default and the subsequent autarky are circled.
The simulation includes two events of crisis. The dark-shaded area corresponds to periods
with the realization of the negative growth shock. The rst one did not trigger a default
event whereas the second one generated a default. The rst crisis starts in period 9, in which
the debt-output ratio is around 40%. Due to the negative growth rate, the country starts
saving by accumulating large trade surpluses, which initially corresponds to a reduction in
the stock of debt, until period 12, when it starts to be a foreign creditor, with negative debt.
The second crisis starts in period 37 and, in this case, the debt-output ratio is greater
than 50%. As shown in gure 5, default is an attractive option when the level of debt is
high and the cycle is closer to a recession. Those conditions trigger a default in period 38:
the total stock of debt is discharged and the country loses part of output and access to
international nancial markets.
There is a strong positive movement in the trade-balance-output ratio at the beginning of
the rst crisis. This variable closely follows the current account. This phenomenon is similar
to the current account reversals observed in some episodes for emerging economies, the so-
called sudden stops: strong capital outows together with falls of output and consumption.19
In the second crisis, the default generates a delay in this movement. Although being
allowed to save after default, the country does not save because of the temporary output
loss generated by the default decision. With redemption, there is an increase in output and,
19More details about the sudden stops in Calvo (1998).
























Figure 6: Sample of simulated time series. Crisis events are represented by the dark-shaded areas. The
light-shaded areas extend the crisis to the point in which output starts decreasing.
at this point, the country starts saving because the crisis period is not over yet.
At the end of both crises, by again experiencing positive growth rates and having already
recovered access to international nancial markets, the country starts borrowing again in
order to front-load consumption out of expected higher future output.
In order to make the analysis of model simulations and data compatible, I add a light-
shaded area at the beginning of the model's crises, extending the crisis period to the last
peak of output, as they are dened in Barro (2006). In the second crisis it does not make a
dierence once that the negative growth shock corresponds to the output peak. This way,
we can justify the fact that, in the data, the strong movement in the current account does
not happen at the beginning of a crisis period in some cases. It is immediate in the cases
31of Indonesia and Chile whereas there is some lag with respect to the beginning of their
crises in the cases of Argentina and the Philippines. These lags could be compared with the
light-shaded areas of gure 6, in which the output is declining due to temporary shocks.
In the data, default does not generate the same eect in the current account as what
happens with the trade balance in the model. The model assumes full default, eliminating the
country's total stock of debt, and only short-term debt. In the real world, debt is composed
of dierent maturities, from dierent creditors, and default is often partial or sequential.
This simplication is common in this literature and is not believed to signicantly aect the
results.































































































































































Figure 7: Time series of output and current account around economic crises (shaded areas).
327 Optimal level of default costs
After calibrating the model, identifying the parameters consistent with the observed emerging
economies' statistics related to debt and default, I search for the optimal costs of default,
the ones that maximize the expected utility of the borrowing country's representative agent.
The main result of the paper is illustrated in gures 8 to 10. For each calibration, four
variables are plotted as functions of the output cost : the welfare gain measured in terms
of the consumption compensation,20 the average debt level, the unconditional probability of
default and the probability of default conditional on a crisis event. Also, they are plotted for
dierent values of the probability of redemption . The plots of the consumption compensa-
tion and the average debt level correspond to gure 2 in the two-period example presented
in section 2.
The lowest probability of redemption considered is 10%, which generates an average
of 10 years exclusion from international credit markets and incurring output losses after
default. This average period corresponds to the value found in the historical dataset of
Tomz and Wright (2007), covering the period 1820|2004, and is used as an upper bound.
The value of 40% corresponds to 21
2 years, which is an average of the mean autarky periods
observed in the 80's and 90's. The highest probabilities considered are 70% and 100%,
corresponding respectively to 11
2 years and to an immediate redemption. In each picture,
the point corresponding to the original values of  and  is indicated.
The output cost of default  assumes values in the interval between zero and 90%. For
high values of , the results converge to the case in which default is ruled out. The lower
is the probability of redemption , the lower is the threshold value of the output cost  for
which default is never chosen. For example, considering the benchmark calibration, it can
20The relative increase in the expected consumption path under the original default costs necessary to
generate the same expected utility.
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Figure 8: Results for dierent values of the output cost  and the probability of redemption  based on
the benchmark calibration.
be observed in the plots of the default probability that, with  = 0:10, it goes to zero with
 = 0:7, whereas it needs  greater than 0:8 when  assumes the original value of 21.28%.
The convergence of the variables to the level corresponding to the no-default case is not
monotonic. The probabilities of default, for example, are hump-shaped functions of the
output cost . Initially, the probability of default increases with the amount of debt held by
the country. It happens because the benet of default is increasing in the amount of debt
that can be discharged, whereas its cost is independent of it. At some point, the cost of
default starts inhibiting its occurrence until it completely rules it out.
Default can be welfare improving as explained by Zame (1993). If its costs to the borrower
34are enough to sustain an optimal level of debt but not so high to eliminate it, default will
be optimally chosen after bad shocks. The maximum welfare level and the corresponding
values of debt and default probabilities for each  are circled in each picture. In all cases,
those points correspond to positive probabilities of default and to average debt levels greater
than their no-default values.
In the benchmark calibration, illustrated in gure 8, the average debt level in the no-
default case is around 4.5 times output, with some default it reaches 6 times output. However,
the higher amount of debt does not translate into a signicant welfare gain when compared
to the no-default case. The results are very similar to the low persistence calibration, which
can be observed in gure 9. The main dierence of this calibration is that lower levels of the
output cost  are required to rule out default. For those calibrations, eliminating default is
very close to optimal for the sovereign borrower in ex-ante terms.
The insurance role of default is more evident in the severe crisis calibration. If we assume
that emerging economies are subject to crisis events similar to the ones observed on OECD
countries, corresponding to an average negative growth rate of 9:46%, the option to default
leads to better allocations, improving welfare, in comparison to its elimination. The hump-
shaped consumption compensation plots in gure 10 best resemble the expected utility plot
in the two-period example illustrated in gure 2.
In this calibration, default indeed improves welfare, allowing the country to borrow more
relying on default as an alternative to the burden of paying back the debt during bad times.
In the no-default case, the stronger precautionary motive brings the average debt level down
to a value around three times output. When  has the original value of 21.28%, a value of
 of 0.7 allows the country to double this average debt level, with a default rate of 1.2%.
The ability to borrow more increases the ex-ante utility of the sovereign country. The higher
welfare level is reached in a level of debt higher than the no-default value but lower than
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Figure 9: Results for dierent values of the output cost  and the probability of redemption  based on
the low persistence calibration.
the maximum level, as in the two-period example. With the original value of , the higher
welfare level is reached when the average debt level is around 4.5 times output.
In all calibrations, both the optimal level of debt and the corresponding no-default value
are extremely high for the standards of emerging economies' sovereign debt. Given that
emerging economies hold a stock of debt of around one half of their output, the option to
default just hurts them by generating higher interest rates and lower borrowing limits. Even
in the severe crisis calibration, for which default can signicantly improve welfare, the model
suggests that emerging economies cannot reach the optimal level of debt due to weak default
punishments. Considering the original values of default costs indicated in the pictures, either
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Figure 10: Results for dierent values of the output cost  and the probability of redemption  based on
the severe crisis calibration.
increasing the output cost  or decreasing the probability of redemption  would generate a
welfare gain to the sovereign borrower.
8 Conclusion
I apply a standard incomplete markets model of sovereign debt in order to investigate the
potential welfare improving properties of the option to default. The new feature of the model
is the introduction of events of strong negative shocks representing economic crises, which
are distinguished from standard business cycles. Those events should be the opportunity
in which the option to default could be welfare improving by providing insurance. The
37insurance provided by the option to default can reduce the precautionary savings motive
of a sovereign government that anticipates the huge burden of debt repayment after output
contractions.
Given the observed levels of debt held by emerging economies and the incidence of de-
fault on crisis events, the results suggest that the option to default and its current costs are
actually limiting the countries' ability to borrow. The welfare of the emerging economy's
representative agent would be improved if the default decision generated harsher punish-
ments. Higher levels of debt would then be sustainable, eect that is strongly dominating
the insurance role of default. For the option to default to be welfare improving, it must result
on the elimination of a higher stock of debt, in a level not reached by emerging economies.
Those results have implication on the evolution of debt workout procedures and the poten-
tial demand for new debt instruments.21 Both should lead to an increase in expected default
costs from the borrower's ex-ante point of view. In a debt renegotiation process aligned
with this objective, the debtor country must have a limited bargaining power, guaranteed
by conditional access to alternative sources of nancing. Concerning debt instruments, they
must have standardized contracts, with rules conditioning their issuance to the absence of
previous debt arrears. Besides penalties, mechanisms that enforce repayment by limiting the
sovereign's ability to default should also be considered. A good example is the securitiza-
tion of future ow receivables, in which future revenues, such as those from oil exports, are
directed to debt service payments.22
Justiable or even unavoidable defaults may not be exclusively a consequence of bad
shocks, but actually a result of moral hazard. Having default as an easy way out of high
21Those issues are discussed in Shleifer (2003).
22The borrower's ability to default is limited because the corresponding funds are managed by an inter-
national trustee, responsible for making debt service payments and then transferring the remaining funds to
the debtor. For more details see IMF (2003).
38indebtedness may stimulate bad debt management and scal policies. Even assuming that
lower costs are a result of changes in the sovereign debt market structure, beyond the control
of any country or international institution, those costs can, at least marginally, be aected
by agent's decisions. It seems puzzling though that recent eorts have moved in the direction
of lower exclusion time, for instance, by the introduction of collective action clauses in debt
instruments; and of increasing the availability of alternative sources of funds, such as pre-
cocious bailouts. Understanding these movements requires considering not only operational
but also political aspects, which is out of the scope of this paper.
The results presented here are in line with Athreya et al. (2009) who investigate how
default penalties on personal loans aect credit access, consumption smoothing and welfare
of households. They show that a positive probability of catastrophic events is necessary to
justify lax default penalties. In the consumer credit literature, those events come usually in
the form of expense shocks. Here, that role is played by the permanent shocks representing
economic crises.
The analysis performed in this paper abstracts from possible eects of debt service and
on the way it is nanced on output, such as distortionary taxation. Also, partial default and
the renegotiation process are not considered. Extending the model with the introduction
of those features is an interesting topic for future research. Also, the costs of default are
introduced exogenously in the model. Welfare analysis could be improved by endogenizing
them, which would require a more complicated model, along the lines of Mendoza and Yue
(2008).
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43A Appendix
A.1 Value function transformation
Detrending consumption in t by the accumulated growth until t 1 times the growth rate in
normal times, eg t 1, results in detrending utility by the factor (eg t 1)
1 . This factor is
used to detrend the value function, dening a Bellman equation with the detrended variables.
Dene:




where b b =
b
eg  1
and   = eg  1.
The transformation of the Bellman equation is performed as follows:
V
c(b;z;g; ) = max













































c V c(b b;z;g) = max
c0;b b0
n
u(b c) + e





44The corresponding budget constraint must also be detrended:
c =  e


























b c = e
g ge
z  b b + b q(b b
0;z;g)e
gb b0
The price function q(b0;z;g; ), which is based on the expected value of repayment given
by the probability of having an output shock inside the no-default set C(b;g; ). Repaymend
is given by the condition V c(b;z;g; )  V d(0;z;g; ), which is not aected by the trans-
formation once that both sides are divided by (eg  1)
1 . The term   is irrelevant since
the growth eect is given by the current growth shock g. The inequality is then equivalent
to c V c(b b;z;g)  c V d(0;z;g), which makes the no-default set b C(b b;g), dened in (5), equal to
C(b;g; ) for any  . Therefore, the price function b q(b b0;z;g) = q(b0;z;g; ).
45A.2 Additional tables
Table 6: List of default events
Standard & Poor's Beim & Calomiris Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer






Philippines 1983 1992 1983 1992 1983
Austria 1914 1915 1914






Italy 1940 1946 1940
Argentina 1956 1965
Argentina 1982 1993 1982 1992 1982
Argentina 2001 2004 2001
Brazil




Brazil 1983 1994 1983 1992 1983
continues on next page
46Table 6: List of default events (continued)
Standard & Poor's Beim & Calomiris Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer
country begin end begin end begin
Chile 1931 1948 1931
Chile 1965
Chile 1972 1975
Chile 1983 1990 1983 1990 1983
Colombia 1900
Colombia 1932 1944 1932
Colombia
Mexico 1914 1922 1914
Mexico 1928 1942
Mexico 1982 1990 1982 1990 1982





Peru 1984 1997 1978 1992 1978
Peru 1983
Uruguay 1915 1921 1915
Uruguay 1933 1938 1933
Uruguay 1983 1985
Uruguay 1987
This table is a subset of table A1 of Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza's \The Costs of Sovereign
Default"corresponding to the countries in the sample used in this paper and the same time period.
Standard & Poor's lists defaults on foreign currency bank debt in the period from 1824 to 2004. Beim
and Calomiris (2001) use a dierent methodology and cover the period from 1800 to 1992. Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2006) is based on data from Beim and Calomiris (2001) and Lindert and Morton (1989)
and covers the period from 1874 to 2003.
47Table 7: List of crisis events
country begin end related to default
Argentina 1912 1917 WW I
Argentina 1929 1932 Great Depression
Argentina 1979 1985 Post-WW II Depression 
Argentina 1998 2002 Post-WW II Depression 
Australia 1928 1931 Great Depression
Austria 1913 1919 WW I 
Austria 1929 1933 Great Depression 
Austria 1944 1945 WW II
Belgium 1916 1918 WW I
Belgium 1939 1943 WW II
Canada 1917 1921 Aftermaths of WW I
Canada 1929 1933 Great Depression
Chile 1912 1915 WW I
Chile 1917 1919 WW I
Chile 1929 1932 Great Depression 
Chile 1971 1975 Post-WW II Depression 
Chile 1981 1983 Post-WW II Depression 
Denmark 1914 1918 WW I
Denmark 1939 1941 WW II
Finland 1913 1918 WW I
France 1916 1918 WW I
France 1929 1932 Great Depression
France 1939 1944 WW II
Germany 1913 1919 WW I
Germany 1928 1932 Great Depression 
Germany 1944 1946 WW II
Greece 1939 1945 WW II
Indonesia 1941 1949 WW II
Indonesia 1997 1999 Post-WW II Depression 
Italy 1918 1921 Aftermaths of WW I
Italy 1940 1945 WW II 
Japan 1943 1945 WW II 
continues on next page
48Table 7: List of crisis events (continued)
country begin end related to default
Korea 1938 1945 WW II
Malaysia 1929 1932 Great Depression
Malaysia 1942 1947 WW II
Mexico 1926 1932 Great Depression 
Netherlands 1913 1918 WW I
Netherlands 1929 1934 Great Depression
Netherlands 1939 1945 WW II
New Zealand 1929 1932 Great Depression
Norway 1939 1944 WW II
Peru 1929 1932 Great Depression 
Peru 1941 1943 WW II
Peru 1981 1983 Post-WW II Depression 
Peru 1987 1992 Post-WW II Depression
Philippines 1940 1946 WW II
Philippines 1982 1985 Post-WW II Depression 
Portugal 1934 1936 Spanish Civil War
Spain 1935 1938 Spanish Civil War
Sri Lanka 1929 1932 Great Depression
Sri Lanka 1943 1946 WW II
Sweden 1913 1918 WW I
Taiwan 1942 1945 WW II
United Kingdom 1918 1921 Aftermaths of WW I
United Kingdom 1943 1947 Aftermaths of WW II
United States 1929 1933 Great Depression
United States 1944 1947 Aftermaths of WW II
Uruguay 1912 1915 WW I 
Uruguay 1930 1933 Great Depression 
Uruguay 1981 1984 Post-WW II Depression 
Uruguay 1998 2002 Post-WW II Depression
Venezuela 1913 1916 WW I
Venezuela 1929 1932 Great Depression
Venezuela 1939 1942 WW II
Venezuela 1977 1985 Post-WW II Depression
This list was extracted from table 1 of Robert J. Barro's \Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the
Twentieth Century". The crisis events are congured as periods of a decline of 15% or more in real per
capita GDP.
49Table 8: Countries included in the sample



















Korea   
Malaysia  
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